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ABSTRACT

Contemporary rhetorician Richard M. Weaver believes that values are inseparable from rhetoric. For him, to be a rhetorician is to direct toward good or evil and to be a rhetorical critic is to determine whether that direction is the "right one" and/or judge whether the rhetorician "is a master of his art." To determine if the rhetorical critic's rhetoric is a reflection of the critic's view of reality it is necessary to address whether a Weaverian model of ethical criticism based on standards for ethical rhetoric can be applied to rhetorical critics' critiques in order to classify types of critics in light of their value system (philosophical orientation or metaphysics). The Weaverian model would have three ascending levels of criticism: description/reconstruction, analysis, and evaluation. Weaver's all-encompassing standard for ethical rhetoric is the obligation for the rhetorician to acknowledge the metaphysical reality of truth, the ideal good. Weaver continually points out that rhetoric has intention and that noble rhetoric's intention is to point toward ultimate metaphysical reality. These standards and the three levels of criticism will not only be useful to label types of critics, but also to classify their metaphysical dreams. This model demonstrates both that every member of a culture has a responsibility for what he says, and that what he says is a reflection of who he is. (Sixty-three notes are included.) (MS)

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A WEAVERIAN MODEL FOR ETHICAL, PERPETUAL CRITICISM

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Richard M. Weaver believed that values are inherent in any rhetoric including the rhetoric of the rhetorical critic. This paper sets forth a Weaverian model of ethical criticism based on standards for ethical rhetoric which can be applied to rhetorical critics' critiques in order to classify types of critics in light of their value system (philosophical orientation or metaphysics).

The contemporary rhetorician Richard M. Weaver,¹ in criticizing modern Western culture, bemoans the absence of knowledge about good and evil, attributing culture's troubles to "the appalling problem, when one comes to actual cases, of getting men to distinguish between better and worse." He continues,

Are people today provided with a sufficiently rational scale of values to attach these predicates with intelligence? There is ground for declaring that modern man has become a moral idiot. So few are those who care to examine their lives, or to accept the rebuke which comes of admitting that our present state may be a fallen state, that one questions whether people now understand what is meant by the superiority of an ideal.²

For Weaver, a value system gives meaning to life and pervades all that is said and done. This belief in the primacy of values is manifested in Weaver's emphasis on ethical rhetoric.

As rhetoric confronts us with choices involving values, the rhetorician is a preacher to us, noble if he tries to direct our passion toward noble ends and base if he uses our passion to confuse and degrade us. Since all utterance influences us in one or the other of these directions, it is important that the direction be the right one, and it is better if this lay preacher is a master of his art.³

In Weaver's view, values are inseparable from rhetoric. To be a rhetorician is to direct toward good or evil. To be a rhetorical critic is to determine whether that direction is the "right one" and/or to judge whether the rhetorician "is a master of his art." That judgment will in turn be an exercise of choice in directing toward good or evil: the critic will choose certain words over others to judge the quality, the oughtness or the rightness of the particular rhetoric under consideration. The rhetorical critic's product is thus shaped by the critic; the product reflects the attitudes and values of the critic. In Seneca's words, "As man speaks, so is he." Weaver states it differently:

As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he morally and intellectually. Once this truth is appreciated you find that you can judge a man not wholly by the specific thing he asks for but also by the way he asks for it. And the latter insight is sometimes very revealing.⁴

And because ultimately, "our conception of metaphysical reality finally governs our conception of everything else,"⁵ the rhetorical critic's rhetoric will itself be a reflection of the critic's view of reality. Thus the question this article will address follows: can a Weaverian model of ethical criticism based on standards for ethical rhetoric be applied to rhetorical critics' critiques in order to classify types of critics in light of their value system (philosophical orientation or metaphysics)?

Richard Weaver says very little about rhetorical criticism as such; however, he implies throughout his writings that it has important functions. In speaking about literary criticism, a close relative of rhetorical criticism, Weaver states, "Criticism is the looking over and the assessment of what has been done in creative hours" Weaver offers further enlightenment on criticism when he speaks as a critic. He refers to elements of criticism which involve a study of "rhetorical structure" and an "imaginative interpretation."⁶

Generally, three functions of criticism have emerged to justify its existence. Albert J. Croft identifies them as the historical, creative, and evaluative functions.⁷ Historical criticism usually entails an investigation into the background of the issue, the present situation, and the immediate constraints of the particular time period in which the rhetoric was presented as well as a probe into who the rhetor was. Historical criticism is useful in presenting a view of what society was like and what issues were important at that time, and this enables the critic to determine the appropriateness and functionality of the rhetoric.

The second function of criticism according to Croft is its creativity: criticism serves "to re-examine, re-evaluate, and if possible to modify contemporary rhetorical theory through the examination of the adaptive processes in speeches. . . ."⁸ This criticism contributes to rhetorical theory by holding up the theory to actual practice in order to discover discrepancies or similarities. In that process of discovery, oftentimes new theory is generated

The evaluative function of criticism is perhaps the most important, at least to traditionalists.⁹ Bryant observes, ". . . most rhetorical as well as poetic treatises, works of critical theory, are couched in the terms of excellent product, the criteria of the admirable, the effective, the proper: the ideal tragedy, oration, argument."¹⁰ The use of this kind of language implies the central role that evaluation plays in rhetorical criticism. Thonssen, Baird, and Braden in Speech Criticism further emphasize evaluation noting that "rhetorical criticism contains both a process or method and a judgment." They identify four types of criticism: impressionistic, analytic, synthetic, and judicial. The impressionistic is the least preferred, while the judicial, which "combines the aims of analytic and synthetic inquiry with the all-important element of evaluation and interpretation of results," is the most preferred.¹¹

In a similar vein, Marie Hochmuth Nichols contends that the critic has the following responsibility: He must serve his society and himself by revealing and evaluating the public speaker's interpretation of the world around him and the peculiar means of expressing that interpretation to his generation.¹² The critic's job, then, is not only to determine what it is that the speaker has done but also to arrive at a judgment about the speaker and the speech. Thus a critic makes choices as to the extent of the

critique, and those choices are reflective of the unique beliefs of the critic as to what is to be included or what is valuable. As Weaver states it, ". . . one may reveal one's whole system of philosophy by the stand one takes on what is pertinent."¹³

WEAVERIAN MODEL OF ETHICAL CRITICISM

Given these functions of rhetorical criticism a Weaverian model of criticism which could be a tool for the critic of criticism would have three stages or levels: description/reconstruction, analysis and evaluation. These levels, which reflect much of Weaver's approach to criticism, build upon each other in a process-like movement with the lowest level being description/reconstruction and the highest being evaluation.

The first stage involves description and/or reconstruction of the act or situation because every act of rhetoric is bounded by the immediate constraints of the situation. Weaver points out the importance of those constraints when he says that the rhetorician ought "to recognize circumstances, which are somewhat determinative in all historical questions."¹⁴ For just as the rhetorician "is compelled to modulate by the peculiar features of an occasion,"¹⁵ and becomes "therefore cognizant of the facts of the situations and is at least understanding of popular attitudes,"¹⁶ so too, the critic must examine these factors through a process of description and reconstruction of the situation. This examination is primary to the critical process because of its role in creating an understanding of both the situation to which the rhetoric was addressed and of the general characteristics of the rhetor. Weaver, when specifically operating as a rhetorical critic, suggests looking at "the rhetorical situation, which must be described in some detail."¹⁷ Naturally description/reconstruction will involve identification in that the critic must

identify elements that constitute the situation, including obvious information about the rhetorician such as general appearance or admitted characteristics.

This identification, however, requires the least amount of critical thinking in that it is more concerned with the obvious.

The next element of this model is analysis. In the first stage the critic generally identifies the rhetor and the rhetorical situation, but in the analysis stage the critic delves, in greater depth, into the nature of the rhetor and the situation thus exploring how the rhetoric is constructed and learning more about what has occurred. And, says Weaver "the process of learning involves interpretation."¹⁸ The interpretation of how and what the rhetoric is then becomes the critic's product and will itself reflect the unique analytical capabilities of the critic. It is this product, which in turn becomes a unique rhetoric, that the critic's critic will be able to examine. This second critic's tools for assessing the analysis stage can include Weaver's standards for ethical rhetoric which will be identified in the next section.

The final stage of evaluation, based on responsible description/reconstruction and analysis, gives meaning and purpose to criticism. It is vitally important to responsible criticism that evaluation take place only after the critic has an understanding of the situation and object upon which he is about to make an evaluative judgment. Once that understanding is established, however, an evaluation should be made. Obviously, evaluation can take different forms and different degrees, but in the Weaverian model each form finds its meaning in the metaphysical reality of goodness and truth. (Weaver never defines clearly all of the characteristics of the "correct" metaphysical dream.) Every judgment will be made in reference to the ideal conception of the way the world ought to be because the

metaphysical dream sanctions distinctions between good and bad.¹⁹ Hence, the judgment ultimately will be an evaluative one in that the worth or value of the thing being judged will be determined in comparison to the ideal.

Nevertheless the entire critical process from description to evaluation demonstrates that the critic has unique power.

The critic endows with meaning the phenomenon to which he attends. We say that he endows it because the meaning shaped in his descriptions is one among several possibilities. In the very act of singling out from among the welter of his experiences those aspects he will set forth as constituting a phenomenon . . . he begins to shape the meaning of the phenomenon for anyone who attends to his critique.²⁰

Even in the selection process the critic must evaluate the possibilities available in order to judge which ought to be selected for the description.

Given the three stages in the Weaverian model of criticism it is apparent that evaluation cannot exist without description/reconstruction and analysis. However, the final goal of criticism is some sort of evaluation. That may not always take the form of a value judgment of the rhetoric's worth; evaluation may involve conclusions regarding the rhetoric's place in history, its immediate or long term effect on the receivers, its worth as an art form, its contribution to theory, or finally, its demonstration of deference to the metaphysical reality. Ultimately, all judgments will, to one degree or another, demonstrate that deference, by reflecting one's vision of how things ought to be. As Weaver states it, a speaker "is going to express his philosophy, or more precisely, his metaphysics. . ." whenever he tries to persuade.²¹

What makes either critic's criticism ethical then is the exercising of the evaluation stage of the criticism model. However, before discussing how the critic's critic can use this model to classify critics it is important to see that there are two dynamics at work. When operating on the evaluation

level, the critic's critic will be treating the first rhetorical criticism as a rhetorical work in its own right and so can evaluate it according to the Weaverian model of criticism. Consequently, the second dynamic requires the critic's critic to assess how the original critic's tools, i.e. Weaver's standards for ethical rhetoric, were applied and how well they were applied. Thus it becomes necessary to identify actual standards for ethical rhetoric. However, because Weaver does not always clearly identify standards, many must be inferred from his writings.²²

STANDARDS FOR ETHICAL RHETORIC

Acknowledging the Metaphysical Reality of Truth

Perhaps Weaver's all-encompassing standard for ethical rhetoric (and as criticism is also rhetoric--criticism), the one to which all others owe deference, is the obligation for the rhetorician to acknowledge the metaphysical reality of truth, the ideal good.²³ For Weaver believes that the metaphysical reality, that which deals with philosophical questions of first principles, is the highest essence of existence. "The reality which excites us is an idea, . . . It is our various supposals about a matter which give it meaning. . . ."²⁴ These ideas of the nature of the reality which exists relationally to, but autonomously from, the physical world constitute a person's metaphysical dream. Defined more specifically, it "is an intuitive feeling about the immanent nature of reality, and this is the sanction to which both ideas and beliefs are ultimately referred for verification."²⁵ Because "our conception of metaphysical reality finally governs our conception of everything else," it is thus a ubiquitous dream independent of a higher referent.²⁶

Although this description of the metaphysical dream may appear to be an intangible criterion for an ethical standard, Weaver does offer further

explanation of the relationships between metaphysical reality, hierarchy, authority and distinctions which provide a more concrete foundation on which a critic may build an analysis.

A metaphysical reality which justifies one's ideas about the world implies a hierarchical ordering of ideas and beliefs. For, states Weaver, "if society is something which can be understood, it must have structure; if it has structure, it must have hierarchy."²⁷ At the top of the structure is truth (which is a synonym for logos²⁸), and truth involves affirming a metaphysical reality. Ultimately, Weaver is forced to beg the question; nevertheless, he notes that his argument, though it might be circular, is operating at a level that is too often ignored or depreciated.

Hierarchical ordering of goods, of values, and of positions of authority is essential to the functioning of any society; it provides a framework for the operation of distinction and prejudice. Distinction allows for the existence of value judgments which distinguish between good and bad, better and worse. This is the rhetorical critic's job--to make judgments--because, says Weaver, "rhetorical expression . . . deals in prejudice and in nothing else."²⁹

Weaver's discussion in praise of Lincoln's rhetoric emphasizes his position that there are times when choices must be made, distinctions need to be clarified. Therefore, there is no such thing as an "excluded middle."³⁰ Weaver contends,

the heart of Lincoln's statesmanship, indeed, lay in his perception that on some matters one has to say "yes" or "no," that one has to accept an alternative to the total exclusion of the other, . . .

. . . Lincoln's position was not one of "tolerance," . . . It was a definite insistence upon right, with no regard for latitude and longitude in moral questions. For Lincoln such questions could neither be relativistically decided nor held in abeyance. There was no middle ground.³¹

Thus rhetoric which attempts no decision, or which tries to "straddle the fence," would be ethically questionable.

Determining the rhetor's basic worldview or presupposition about the nature of existence is not always easy. However, by assessing the product in light of the metaphysical reality of hierarchy and distinction with the truth or ideal as the central authority, making that determination is possible.³² Weaver contends that there are three possible views from which humans operate: brutality, sentimentality, or the unsentimental sentiment.³³ Ultimately, brutality and sentimentality combine because they both operate at the periphery of reality, the sensate level. The unsentimental sentiment, however, functions through intuition and faith on what might be called a spiritual level and is also referred to as one's metaphysical dream.

Weaver provides labels for people who have demonstrated these three attitudes at various times in history.³⁴ The unsentimental sentiment is apparent in the "philosophic doctor" (similar to Plato's philosopher king) who was prominent in the Middle Ages as the "possessor of highest learning." This person was capable of comprehending principles and could deal with ultimate questions which in turn placed him at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge. Next, society witnessed the idealist who is characterized by the Southern gentleman. The gentleman's idealism, says Weaver, is good, but it lacks an authoritative metaphysic. Finally, Weaver identifies the barbarian who is characterized by egotism and an obsession with materialism and fragmentation. Weaver places the scientist of contemporary times who fails to consider deeper implications into this category because the scientist is primarily concerned with that particular knowledge which is objectively verifiable. Because the term "scientist" has vocational connotations, Weaver also employs the term "spoiled child" to one who is seeking immediate gratification and is thus

content with peripheral knowledge of a collection of facts rather than the wisdom which comes from understanding general principles.³⁵

Because of the interwoven relationships between humans' world views, humans' very nature, and their words, a standard for ethical rhetoric must encompass the ought, that tertium quid to which humans turn to legitimize and justify their words and deeds. There is, states Weaver, the "rhetorical speaker's obligation toward the ideal. . . ." ³⁶ The standard of measurement for ethical rhetoric then involves the following questions: Is this particular rhetoric reflecting a lower level of sentimentality, one which is focused primarily on the sensate level of existence? Or, is the rhetoric cognizant of order and hierarchical structure in existence which, consequently, identifies resemblances to, and points in the direction of, ultimate good?

Audience Adaptation

For Weaver a standard of audience adaptation means rhetors have a responsibility to adapt their message to a particular audience in a specific situation.

It is part of the conditio humana that we live at particular times and in particular places. These are productive of special or unique urgencies, which the speaker has got to recognize and to estimate. Hence, just as man from the point of view of rhetoric is not purely a thinking machine, or a mere seat of rationality, so he is not a creature abstracted from time and place.³⁷

Elsewhere Weaver states, "the true rhetorician as a noble lover of the good, . . . is compelled to modulate by the peculiar features of an occasion, this is his method."³² Rhetoric (and the rhetorical criticism) which fails to consider the unique audience and situation would then be ethically suspect.

Hierarchy of Arguments

The first two standards are quite general in their application; however,

Weaver also refers to the ethical nature of the specific content of speech. An aspect which he has examined at length is one's choice of the type of argument to be used. He believes there are four general ways of looking at reality. "The first three are usually expressed in the language of philosophy, as being, cause, and relationship. The fourth, which stands apart from these because it is an external source, is testimony and authority."³⁹ Having identified these he notes that "the reasoner reveals his philosophical position by the source of argument which appears most often in his major premise because the major premise tells us how he is thinking about the world."⁴⁰

Accordingly, there is a hierarchy of preferable arguments with an argument from definition being the highest because it deals "with fundamental and unchanging properties."⁴¹ Although consideration of the audience may influence one's choice of argument, because argument from definition comes closest to reflecting the hierarchical center of reality, the habitual use of it would be the most ethical kind of argument.

The next category in the hierarchical scheme is that of relationship or similitude. This argument can be very good because it tends to unify the world in the perspective of analogy. And analogies, if we are being realistic, form the basis of "our profoundest intuitions."⁴²

The third type of argument in the hierarchy is cause and effect. Weaver notes that "we all have to use it because we are historical men."⁴³ However, he finds that those who use it habitually tend to be pragmatists. What he terms as "an even less admirable subvariety of this source [cause-effect] is the appeal to circumstance, which is the least philosophical of all the topics of argument." Consequently, it is the least ethical because "it simply cites a brute circumstance, . . ." and does nothing to point toward the metaphysical

reality.⁴⁴

The final category is one which is considered an external source because of its use of testimony or authority. The problem with this category is that one must determine the validity or status of the authority. "The sound maxim," notes Weaver, "is that an argument based on authority is as good as the authority." Its ethical nature is determined by whether or not the arguments "are deferential toward real hierarchy."⁴⁵

Ultimate Terms

Another frequently discussed standard for ethical rhetoric (criticism) is the rhetorician's choice of terms. Weaver continually points out that rhetoric has intention and that noble rhetoric's intention is to point toward ultimate metaphysical reality. His treatment of arguments in regard to this reality is based on examining propositions, but he notes that "a single term is an incipient proposition, . . ."⁴⁶ Thus the choice of terms, the naming process which is involved in rhetoric also becomes highly related to the rhetorician's moral character.

There are three categories of ultimate terms: "god" terms, "devil" terms, and "charismatic" terms. The "god" term is ". . . that expression about which all other expressions are ranked as subordinate and serving dominations and powers. Its force imparts to the others their lesser degree of force, and fixes the scale by which degrees of comparison are understood."⁴⁷ The god term has incredible power to legitimize ideas, positions, and actions because it draws from accepted cultural values, playing on the audience's "sense of history," on their ability to remember how that particular term has proved to be positive in the past, and thereby associates that positive past to the present. The opposite "devil" term is capable of turning away from the hierarchy of reality toward a level of sensate

existence. The "charismatic" term has "a power which is not derived, but which is in some mysterious way given. . . ."48 It has a power to evoke emotional support.

Because of the terms' power to direct people toward good or evil or the power to lead them to agree with the individual who is espousing them, Weaver holds that an ethical rhetorician (critic) will choose his terms carefully, being ever cognizant of their power. They must be ultimate terms in regard to a rational vision of the hierarchical structure of reality.

Language Use

The final standard used to determine if the rhetoric(ian) (critic) is ethical is to test how language is used. Attempting to disguise language as neutral or making unwarranted "semantic shifts" is unethical.49 Weaver contends that language is a covenant.

A covenant--and I like, in this connection, the religious overtones of the word--binds us at deeper levels and involves some kind of confrontation of reality. . . . As long as the convention is in effect, it has to be respected like any other rule, and this requires that departures from it must justify themselves.50

Because language is so closely related to the spiritual, metaphysical reality in that it reflects the ideal ought, Weaver becomes outraged at the thought of those who arbitrarily assign words new meanings without regard for the ideal which they reflect.

A conscientious user of language will also be cognizant of the "rhetoric of grammar." Weaver describes the influence of grammar on language use.

Rhetoric in its practice is a matter of selection and arrangement, but conventional grammar imposes restraints upon both of these. All this amounts to saying what every sensitive user of language has sometimes felt; namely, that language is not a purely passive instrument, but that, owing to this public acceptance, while you are doing something with it, it is doing something with you, or with your intention.51

Thus an ethical use of language entails sensitivity to meaning and to

grammatical use.

There are numerous factors which go into making quality rhetoric, which means that obviously these standards are not meant to be applied in some sort of empirical manner which seeks an objective measurement; rather, Weaver would say that the way to identify them, at least in part, is through the application of intuition which is directed by a vision of the ideal. The ultimate standard, then, which encompasses all, asks if the rhetorician (critic) is seeking to enlighten and edify as opposed to meeting his own needs.⁵²

In this stage one could apply some of the standards for ethical rhetoric gleaned from Weaver's various writings. For example, a critic who wants to identify what type of argument the speaker is using can turn to Weaver's hierarchy of arguments and apply it. In doing so, however, the critic will be not only identifying arguments but applying his own analysis of their nature in order to determine how to classify them. The same is true when the critic questions if any other standards are applicable. For instance, to determine if the rhetorician was pointing to metaphysical truth by acknowledging the existence of authority whether in specific word choice, use of arguments, level of adaptation, actual delivery, etc., the critic must analyze both what is meant by authority and what the rhetorician is saying and doing. Hence, the process of identifying what elements are at work in a particular rhetoric is not merely a function of description/reconstruction; what is identified will be determined by the individual critic's analytical capacities.

CLASSIFYING CRITICS

A critic's critic could use these Weaverian standards for ethical rhetoric to assess at what level of criticism the original critic is

operating. If the standards are applied then the critic is beyond the descriptive/reconstructive and at the analysis level. Finally, the critic's critic would ask, does the original critic evaluate how the rhetoric measures up to the standards. These three levels of criticism indicate types of critics or, as Weaver sees it, different relationships to culture. For in working as a critic, one demonstrates a personal relationship to culture and to metaphysical reality which will be reflected in the critique. Weaver identifies three possible relationships to culture which can be applied to the critic: a member of culture, a "foreigner" born outside of culture, or "a member of the culture who has to some degree estranged himself from it through study and reflection." The first person, a member of culture, is surrounded and influenced by it because "culture is culturing.'" This person's capacity as a critic is limited because he only "can do something about it to the extent of carrying it on by living according to its prescriptions."⁵³ Also this critic often lacks the aesthetic distance necessary for an accurate picture.

The second kind of critic is one who is outside of culture. These people "the Greeks called barbaroi--'those speaking a different language.'" Although they are not of the culture, they may be from another civilized culture which provides them with "different intellectual and moral bearings. . . ." Consequently, those outside the culture are unable to empathize with those in it and cannot understand clearly the motivations of those in the culture. Nevertheless, as Weaver states, "there is sometimes critical value in an outside view" because these kind of critics are able to see things from an objective distance.⁵⁴

Another type of critic who is also outside of culture is the one who at one time was a member and is now estranged from that culture. This person has

a "hope of doing something about a culture that is weakening."⁵⁵ This critic has the advantages of both those who are members of culture and those who are foreign to it. Weaver describes this outsider:

He has not lost the intuitive understanding which belongs to him as a member, but he has added something to that. A temporary alienation from his culture may be followed by an intense preoccupation with it, but on a more reflective level than that of the typical member. He has become sufficiently aware of what is outside it to see it as a system or an entity. This person may be a kind of doctor of culture; in one way he is crippled by his objectivity, but in another way he is helped to what he must have, point of view and a consciousness of freedom of movement.⁵⁶

This "cultural doctor" is thus able to sympathize with the pains of cultural problems and, at the same time, has the ability to diagnose the cause of the problem and prescribe proper treatment.

These three types of critics roughly correspond to the three types of people identified earlier. The cultural doctor demonstrates similarities to the philosophical doctor. Weaver holds both positions to be the highest and most desirable because both seem to have a true grasp of reality. The critic who is a foreigner of the culture, in certain ways, corresponds to the gentleman idealist. Both can have positive impact on society but lack vision of ultimate reality. The third type of critic is the member of the culture who, therefore, cannot escape everyday participation in it--a sense of immediacy. This person can be compared to the scientists and "spoiled children" because of their need to live for the present, acting on the sensate level and seeking immediate gratification. Hence, this type of critic has the least impact, the least desirable conclusions as a critic.

Not only is it possible to use Weaver to label types of critics, but also to classify their metaphysical dreams. Given the three different stages of criticism, description/reconstruction, analysis, and evaluation, it is possible to further type critics by identifying their critical goals as being

one of these three. For just as the moral and intellectual character of rhetors is reflected in their words, so is the moral and intellectual character of the critics reflected in their words. Both are making use of language for rhetorical purposes, and, as Edwin Black points out, a rhetorical critic's style is an important part of the kind of criticism produced.⁵⁷

A critic with the primary goal of description/reconstruction, who phrases the critique in as neutral a way as possible by making no reference to the value or worth of the rhetoric, is operating with a similar attitude or "dream" toward reality as the brute "who is the barbarian living amid culture. . . ."58 The brute lives by raw experiential sensation and, to a certain degree, so does a critic whose only concern is description/reconstruction of the rhetorical situation for the purpose of enhancing understanding about it. For this type of critic is concerned, therefore, only with what the senses apprehend, with the identification and collection of various factors. The descriptive/reconstructive critic might be termed the Weaverian "rhetorical scientist."

A second type of attitude or dream manifest in the critic is that of sentimentality. The critic who operates on the analytical level but does not rise above to the evaluative level corresponds to Weaver's sentimental fool. Here the critic may recognize that it is necessary to analyze certain data in order to classify it and dissect the rhetoric. However, this critic bases the analysis only on personal feelings and experiences with these kind of details. Oftentimes the evaluation is avoided because of the risks evaluation requires in revealing a personal value system which means inevitably an intrusion on someone else's value system. Hence, this "rhetorical gentleman" is still operating on a sensate level, touching only the periphery of the reality of the rhetoric.

Just as the "true man of culture" recognizes a need to be governed by an unsentimental sentiment which is manifest in general beliefs and specific ideas about the world, so too the most desirable kind of critic is the one who evaluates the rhetoric recognizing that evaluation relies on the firm establishment of description/reconstruction and analysis. This critic is directed by an intuitive understanding of how things ought to be and, thus, is able to compare the rhetoric at hand with a spiritual, ideal rhetoric. That ideal is the ultimate standard of measurement made more tangible in Weaver's standards for ethical rhetoric. However, as Croft notes, "one does not 'criticize' by finding illustrations of standard, pre-conceived forms. He uses the framework of standard techniques as norms to help him discover and evaluate the ways in which a speaker's use of techniques is distinctive."⁵⁹ The evaluative critic, then, is not only concerned with effect or with the end of the rhetoric, but is also interested in the means. Weaver states, "Means and end are related so intimately that means unavoidably have an influence upon ends."⁶⁰ Thus, it is possible for a critic, at one particular time, to focus on a description of what took place, all the while reflecting elements of evaluation--if the critic is operating as the preferable "rhetorical doctor."

CONCLUSIONS

Rhetorical criticism has positive functions which aid in both historical and creative understanding and which, through the evaluative process, provide greater impetus for the development of cultural insights into the role of ethical rhetoric. A Weaverian model for criticism which culminates at an evaluation level has three stages: the descriptive/reconstructive, the analytical, and the evaluative stages. These stages are each valuable in their own right, but they are sanctioned only through the evaluative process.

It is that evaluative process that the critic's critic is undertaking when he tries to assess the original critique in light of two dynamics: the first dynamic involves critiquing the original criticism in light of Weaver's model (assessing at what level the original critic worked), and the second dynamic requires the critic's critic to ask how the tools, i.e. Weaver's standards, were applied and how well they were applied.

Thus, Weaverian standards which identify the nature of ethical rhetoric can be useful tools for the work of criticism and include the following:

1. A rhetorician who defers to the metaphysical reality of truth, acknowledging authority and making distinctions which demonstrate the hierarchical nature of reality is ethically commendable.
2. A rhetorician who is cognizant of the constraints of the specific audience and the immediate situation is ethically commendable.
3. A rhetorician who consistently uses a higher order of argument is ethically commendable.
4. A rhetorician who uses rational (in relation to the ideal) ultimate terms is ethically commendable.
5. A rhetorician who demonstrates sensitivity to language use by avoiding pseudo-neutral language, making no unwarranted semantic shifts and using grammar properly is ethically commendable.

By applying the Weaverian model for ethical criticism one finds three types of rhetorical critics characterized by the three different attitudes. These correspond to Weaver's identification of types of people within a culture and their metaphysical dreams or worldviews. By applying the model, in terms of assessing which stage is the critic's goal, to the critic's critique, it becomes possible to classify their attitudes. Based on Weaver's categories of worldviews and their corresponding label, the following chart summarizes the classification of critics:

<u>WORLDVIEWS</u>	<u>LABELS</u>	<u>RELATIONSHIP TO CULTURE</u>	<u>CRITICAL MODEL/GOALS</u>	<u>TYPE OF CRITIC</u>
Unsentimental sentiment	Philosophical doctor	Estranged member/True member	Evaluation (Based on standards)	Rhetorical doctor
Sentimentality	Gentleman idealist	Foreigner/Sentimental fool	Analysis	Rhetorical gentleman
Brutality	Scientist/Spoiled child	Member of culture/Barbarian	Description/Reconstruction	Rhetorical scientist

The critic who operates consistently as a rhetorical doctor with evaluation, which uses the five standards for ethical rhetoric, as the goal is an ethical critic and one to be emulated.

This model demonstrates both that every member of a culture has a responsibility for what he says, and that what he says is a reflection of who he is. Criticism, then, becomes an endless process--one might analyze and critique critic's critic who critiqued the critic who critiqued a particular rhetorician. In this way all members of society are held responsible for their words. Because "men are born rhetoricians,"⁶¹ rhetorical criticism is an important force in society which aids that society by not allowing it to "lose sight of the order of values as the ultimate sanction of rhetoric."⁶² Accordingly, that order of values is something which cannot be realistically denied. Those who do try to deny them are operating from, in Weaver's perspective, a flawed metaphysical dream as well as an incomplete vision of the way reality is and ought to be. Being able to identify the forces which shape and motivate human thought and behavior through rhetorical criticism once again demonstrates the following of Weaver's contentions:

As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he morally and intellectually. Once this truth is appreciated you find that you can judge a man not wholly by the specific thing he asks for but also by the way he asks for it. And the latter insight is sometimes very revealing.⁶³

ENDNOTES

¹For an overview of Weaver, the man, and his views on rhetoric see Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric (Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc., 1985), pp. 45-75. Hereafter referred to as Contemporary Perspectives.

²Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948, Midway reprint, 1976), pp. 1-2. Hereafter referred to as Ideas.

³Weaver, Ideas, p. 27.

⁴Richard M. Weaver, "A Responsible Rhetoric," eds. Thomas D. Clark and Richard L. Johannesen, Intercollegiate Review 12 (Winter 1976-1977): 87. Hereafter referred to as Responsible. Throughout this article the term "man" is used in the generic sense unless otherwise noted.

⁵Weaver, Ideas, p. 51.

⁶Weaver, Visions of Order: The Cultural Crisis of Our Time (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), p. 148. Hereafter referred to as Visions. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (South Bend, Indiana: Regnery/Gateway, Inc., 1953), p. 4. Hereafter referred to as Ethics.

⁷Albert J. Croft, "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," in The Province of Rhetoric, eds. Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1965), p. 409. Hereafter referred to as "Functions."

⁸Croft, "Functions," p. 409.

⁹Bernard L. Brock and Robert L. Scott, eds., Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth-Century Perspective, 2nd ed. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1980), p. 470. Hereafter referred to as Methods.

¹⁰Donald C. Bryant, Rhetorical Dimensions in Criticism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), p. 37. Hereafter referred to as Dimensions.

¹¹Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W. Braden, Speech Criticism, 2nd ed. (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1970). pp. 19, 21.

¹²Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 73.

¹³Weaver, Ethics, p. 182.

¹⁴Richard M. Weaver, Life Without Prejudice (Chicago: Regnery, 1965), p. 79.

¹⁵Richard M. Weaver, Language Is Sermonic: Richard M. Weaver on the

Nature of Rhetoric, eds. Richard L. Johannesen, Rennard Strickland, and Ralph T. Eubanks (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), p. 75. Hereafter referred to as Language.

¹⁶Weaver, Language, p. 182.

¹⁷Weaver, Ethics, p. 166.

¹⁸Weaver, Ideas, pp. 18-19.

¹⁹Weaver, Ideas, pp. 18-19.

²⁰Brock and Scott, Methods, p. 19.

²¹Weaver, Language, p. 212.

²²For other perspectives on standards for Weaver's ethical rhetoric see Richard L. Johannesen, "Richard M. Weaver on Standards for Ethical Rhetoric," Central States Speech Journal 29 (Summer 1978): 127-137, or Foss, et al., Contemporary Perspectives, pp. 54-67.

²³Weaver, Ethics, p. 18.

²⁴Weaver, Ideas, pp. 26-27. Much of Weaver's material here reflects a Platonic influence with the emphasis on the Ideal.

²⁵Weaver, Ideas, p. 18.

²⁶Weaver, Ideas, p. 51.

²⁷Weaver, Ideas, p. 35.

²⁸Weaver, Ideas, p. 36. The closest he comes to defining truth is when he compares it to the ideal Good, see Ethics, p. 25. At various times Weaver alludes to the existence of God as both the highest authority and as that truth. The theological connection of logos to Jesus Christ offers an interesting perspective to a metaphysical discussion. In fact, Weaver begins to trace the connection in his chapter in Ideas, "The Power of the Word." This position, however, is also sprinkled with his Platonism and thus is confusing. Note the discussion in Foss, et al., Contemporary Perspectives, pp. 72-73.

²⁹Weaver, Life, p. 115.

³⁰Weaver, Ethics, pp. 106-107.

³¹Weaver, Ethics, pp. 105-106.

³²Weaver, The Southern Tradition at Bay: A History of Postbellum Thought, eds. George Core and M.E. Bradford (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1968), p. 40.

- 33Weaver, Ideas, Chap. I, "The Unsentimental Sentiment," pp. 18-34.
- 34Weaver, Ideas, p. 52-58.
- 35Weaver, Ideas, p. 113. See entire Chapter VI, "The Spoiled-child Psychology."
- 36Weaver, Language, p. 216.
- 37Weaver, Language, p. 206.
- 38Weaver, Ethics, p. 18.
- 39Weaver, Language, pp. 208-209; see also Ethics, pp. 55-114.
- 40Weaver, Ethics, p. 55.
- 41Weaver, Language, p. 209. For an in-depth of Weaver's categories of arguments see Language, pp. 208-213 and Ethics, Chaps. 13 and 14.
- 42Weaver, Language, p. 214.
- 43Weaver, Language, p. 214.
- 44Weaver, Language, p. 215. Shortly before Weaver's death he seemed to be developing another category of argument which is closely related--the argument from history. See Weaver, "Two Orators," eds. George Core and M.E. Bradford, Modern Age 14 (Summer-Fall 1970): 226-242.
- 45Weaver, Language, p. 216.
- 46Weaver, Language, p. 88.
- 47Weaver, Language, p. 88.
- 48Weaver. Language, pp. 105-106.
- 49Weaver, Ideas, pp. 150-155; Visions, pp.67-70; Language, pp. 139-158.
- 50Weaver, Ideas, pp. 154-155.
- 51Weaver, Ethics, p. 116.
- 52Weaver, "A Responsible Rhetoric," ed. Thomas D. Clark and Richard L. Johannesen, The Intercollegiate Review 12 (Winter 1976-1977): 85-86.
- 53Weaver, Visions, pp. 6-7.
- 54Weaver, Visions, p. 7.
- 55Weaver, Visions, p. 7.

- 56 Weaver, Visions, p. 7.
- 57 Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method (New York: Macmillan, 1965, Repr. University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p. xiv.
- 58 Weaver, Ideas, p. 24.
- 59 Croft, "Functions," p. 407.
- 60 Weaver, Visions, p. 103; see also Ethics, p. 193.
- 61 Weaver, Language, p. 221.
- 62 Weaver, Language, p. 225.
- 63 Weaver, "Responsible," p. 87.